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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990501-CA 
v. : 
BRIANS WINK, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conditional plea of guilty to attempted theft, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999) (in Add. A). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court properly determine that defendant was not subjected to custodial 
interrogation when he underwent an intake interview with a youth corrections counselor 
at Decker Lake upon his return to custody following his escape? 
On appeal, the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny 
a motion to suppress are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, and the trial court's 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. State v. Riggs. 1999 UT App. 271, f^ 7, 
987 P.2d 1281; State v. Parra. 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah App. 1998). However, the trial 
court's application of the legal standard to the facts should be given a "measure of 
discretion." Riggs. 1999 UT App. 271, % 7, 987 P.2d 1281 (quoting State v. Moreno. 910 
P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule provisions pertinent to the 
resolution of the issue presented on appeal is contained herein, including: 
Amendment V, United States Constitution: 
No person shal l . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with theft, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999), for stealing a mini-van (R. 4). He filed a 
motion to suppress his confession to the theft, which the trial court denied after a hearing 
and argument (R. 23-26, 29; 71:3-4).1 Defendant thereafter entered a conditional plea to 
attempted theft, a third degree felony, reserving the right to appeal the court's denial of 
his suppression motion (R. 30-39).2 Defendant timely filed his appeal (R. 44). 
1
 Citation herein to transcripts will be to the volume number stamped on the cover 
of each volume, followed by a colon and the internal page number, i.e., R. 69: 7. 
"Pursuant to State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah App. 1988). 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In early January 1999, defendant was incarcerated at Decker Lake for an offense 
unrelated to this matter and was assigned temporarily to the Genesis work program (R. 1, 
69:11-12). Genesis is a program designed for individuals to work off restitution, 
community service, and fines (R. 69:12). On January 4, defendant walked away from the 
program with another individual (R. 1; 69:7, 15). A warrant issued for his arrest based on 
his escape (R. 21; 69: 11-12). On January 5, the two escapees made their way to Smith's 
Food Store, where defendant stole a screwdriver (R. 69:16). Defendant then went to 
Trolley Square, walked along an adjacent street until he found a mini-van, then used the 
screwdriver to start it (R. 69:16). He drove off in the van, ultimately going to South 
Towne Mall, where he stole something from one of the stores (R. 69:17-18). Mall 
security chased him to the van, and defendant drove away (R. 69:18). 
About 5:00 p.m., defendant called Decker Lake to turn himself in (R. 69:13). The 
staffer he spoke to contacted Officer Corbett Ford to pick up defendant (R. 69:13, 28). 
Officer Ford could not get away immediately, so he contacted defendant and told him that 
it would be an hour or so before he would be by for him (R. 69:28). Defendant was 
waiting when Officer Ford arrived, and the two drove to Decker Lake (R. 69:28-29). 
During the drive, the two conversed about why defendant had run and what he'd been 
doing (R. 69:29).3 
3Defendant does not challenge this conversation on appeal. 
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Upon arrival at Decker Lake, defendant was issued a uniform, searched for 
contraband, then given an intake interview (R. 69:12, 20-22). The interview was not 
designed to obtain criminal information, but allowed a counselor with the Decker Lake 
facility to evaluate defendant's well-being, demeanor, and need for special attention (R. 
69:12-13, 33). Both the counselor and Officer Ford were present during the intake 
interview (R. 69:11, 19). 
Because the normal staff was occupied, Chris Pacheco conducted the interview (R. 
69:12, 20-21). Pacheco was a counselor for the Department of Human Services in their 
Division of Youth Corrections (R. 69:10-11). As such, he held the same position as any 
of the normal staff of the center who would normally have done the interview (R. 69:20-
21). His duties involved safety and security issues for the residents and being a role 
model and mentor (R. 69:20). Pacheco's primary concerns were the safety and security 
of defendant, the facility, and the remaining residents and employees (R. 69:13). He was 
concerned that defendant might have ingested drugs or alcohol and require special 
treatment or possibly suicide intervention (R. 69:13-14, 22). To more readily assess 
defendant's condition, he conducted the interview by asking defendant questions which 
elicited a narrative from defendant (R. 69:14). 
Pacheco began by asking defendant "[W]here have you been? What have you 
been doing?" (idL). Defendant responded by saying that he and another boy ran from 
Genesis, "went somewhere," and ended up at South Towne Mall (id). Pacheco asked 
4 
again, "Where have you been?" (id.). Defendant than added a phone call and a trip to 
Trolley Square to his story (R. 69:14-15). Because the story did not yet make sense, 
Pacheco noted to defendant that there were holes in the story and asked him to "fill me in 
more of what's been going on" (R. 69:15, 24). 
At some point in the forty-five minute interview defendant hesitated, then said, "F 
it [sic].... I'm going to get in trouble anyway" (R. 69:15, 18, 24). He then told Pacheco 
the story again, naming his cohort, admitting the theft of a screwdriver from Smith's, 
admitting the theft of the mini-van, and explaining how he used the screwdriver to start 
the van (R. 69:15-17). Pacheco once more noted the existence of gaps in the story, and 
defendant once more retold the story in more detail, noting that he took something from 
South Towne Mall and was chased by undercover security who knocked on the windows 
of the van as he drove away, and that he ultimately walked away from the van and left it 
running (R. 69:17-19). 
At that point, Officer Ford entered the discussion for the first time to determine 
where the van was located so that it could be recovered and removed, as it posed a safety 
hazard (R. 69:30-31, 33). Defendant could not remember the exact location he had left 
the van, but it was ultimately located near where Ford had picked up defendant, and it 
was returned to its owner (R. 69:28, 30-31). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court properly utilized the "added imposition" test to determine that 
defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
Defendant was a prisoner incarcerated on other charges at the time of the 
interview, requiring that his custodial status for Miranda puiposes be reviewed under the 
"added imposition" test utilized by the Tenth Circuit. That test focuses on whether there 
was "a change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added imposition on 
his freedom of movement." Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 428 (9th Cir. 1978). No 
such added imposition existed here. The interview was conducted by a counselor, not a 
police officer; there was no show of force or intimidation; defendant was not cuffed or 
otherwise required to endure the interview; the questions were not accusatory; the 
interview was "standard operating procedure," suggesting that defendant had previously 
undergone one at his initial placement and knew what to expect; the entire interview 
lasted only forty-five minutes; and no added pressure was applied to defendant to detain 
him. There was no reason for a reasonable prisoner to believe that there was a restriction 
of his freedom over and above that to be found in his normal prison setting. Accordingly, 
defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. 
Neither was defendant subjected to interrogation, as is required for a Miranda 
violation to be found. No police officer questioned defendant prior to his voluntary 
confession, the questioning was not accusatory, and there was no reason to suspect 
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defendant of any criminal act beyond his escape from the Genesis program. 
Consequently, there was no reason to anticipate any incriminating response would be 
forthcoming. The questioning itself was general and was not likely to produce an 
incriminating response from defendant. Absent some form of coercion by a police officer, 
the confession should be deemed to be a voluntary response to the counselor's comments 
that the story defendant gave was incomplete. Accordingly, the questioning did not 
amount to an interrogation and no Fifth Amendment violation occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT DEFENDANT 
WAS SUBJECTED TO NEITHER CUSTODY NOR 
INTERROGATION FOR MIRANDA PURPOSES WHERE THERE 
WAS NO ADDED IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS AND NO 
INTERROGATION OF THE SORT WHICH WOULD REQUIRE 
ADMINISTRATION OF A MIRANDA WARNING 
Defendant argues that the trial court's denial of his suppression motion is 
erroneous because defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation without the benefit 
of Miranda warnings4. Br. of Aplt. at 6-36. He claims that the intake interview between 
defendant and Pacheco, the youth corrections counselor, amounted to custodial 
interrogation and that, because it occurred without any Miranda warnings, his confession 
that he stole a mini-van must be suppressed because it was obtained in violation of his 
4Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 481, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966). 
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constitutional rights.5 Icl However, the trial court found to the contrary, and defendant 
fails to establish error in the lower court's decision. 
A. The Trial Court's Ruling 
Based on essentially uncontested facts, the trial court rendered a short, concise oral 
ruling, finding that defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda and was not 
subjected to interrogation: 
Let's take care of the suppression issue first. And let me say to both 
of you that these comments are intended to be summary in nature only, 
because I have [not] yet had the opportunity to reduce this to written form, 
which may very well become necessary.[6] But let me simply say that I'm 
going to deny the Defense's Motion to Suppress in this particular case, in 
essence, for the following summary reasons. I've had a chance now to read 
the authorities that were submitted to me and also go through the transcript 
that was submitted to me also. And in this court's opinion it's appropriate 
to deny the motion to suppress for the reason that I've concluded that the 
appropriate test to be applied regarding the issues in this Motion to 
Suppress is the concept of added imposition. And based upon this court's 
determination of the facts and circumstances of this case, this court is of the 
opinion that there is - was no added imposition imposed in this particular 
case warranting the administration of the Miranda warnings. Furthermore, 
in this court's view, this court is of the opinion that the counselor, and there 
was a counselor involved in this discussion with Mr. Swink, consistent with 
his testimony in this court's view, first of all, he didn't have prior, 
(inaudible) he didn't have prior knowledge of the specific criminal activity 
defendant limits his argument to "custodial interrogation" and makes no separate 
Fifth Amendment argument. Hence, the State does not brief the issue herein. 
6The trial court did not reduce its ruling to writing or enter written findings of fact 
or conclusions of law. However, because the underlying facts are essentially undisputed, 
this court need not remand the case to the trial court for entry of written findings of fact, 
but may dispose of the matter in this appeal. See State v. Mirquet 914 P.2d 1144, 1148-
49 (Utah 1996). 
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when he had this conversation with Mr. Swink. He also testified, in this 
court's view, and it seems to be reasonable and consistent that his primary 
purpose was that of the safety of Mr. Swink, the safety of other individuals 
in the facility and the facility itself. That in essence, this was an intake 
interview. It lasted approximately 45 minutes in duration. Based upon the 
conversation, it appears that there was no coercion or compulsion of any 
nature in this court's view in any way. And for all those reasons, and again, 
that's intended to be a summary, this court does not believe that the facts 
and circumstances necessitated the admonition, the Miranda admonition. 
For those reasons, I'm going to deny the Motion to Suppress. 
(R. 71:3-4) (in Add. B). This ruling is wholly appropriate given the facts of this case: 
defendant was neither in custody for purposes of Miranda nor subjected to interrogation. 
B. Defendant's Prisoner Status Requires Use of the "Added Imposition" Test for 
Determining Custody for Miranda Purposes; There was No Added Imposition 
on Defendant's Restraint Which Would Support a Finding of Custody 
The question of whether a statement was obtained in violation of Miranda requires 
a review of the circumstances surrounding the statement in order to determine whether 
the accused was in custody and subject to interrogation or the functional equivalent 
thereof without the benefit of Miranda warnings. State v. Yoder. 935 P.2d 534, 545 
(Utah App. 1997) ("Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is 
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent") (quoting Rhode 
Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291, 300-01, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980)). 
The first part of the analysis deals with custody. Miranda warnings are required 
"as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal 
arrest." State v. Mirquet 914 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996) (quotations omitted). In other 
words, the warnings are required whenever the circumstances of an interrogation Mexert[] 
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upon [the] detained person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his 
privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional 
rights." Berkemerv. McCartv. 468 U.S. 420, 437, 104 S. Ct. 3138 (1984); State v. 
Mirquet 844 P.2d 995, 997-98 (Utah App. 1992), affd. 914 P.2d 1144 (1996). Four 
factors are widely used to guide the decision as to when one is in custody and entitled to a 
Miranda warning prior to a formal arrest (1) the site of interrogation; (2) whether the 
investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were 
present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation. Mirquet 914 P.2d at 1147; Salt 
Lake City v. Carner. 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). 
This test is of little utility in a secure setting because the inmate has already been 
arrested and is in custody, usually on an unrelated charge, at the time the questioning 
occurs. Hence, his freedom of action is already curtailed to the degree associated with a 
formal arrest under the general Miranda test. This situation leads to the unworkable 
conclusion under the general test for custody that all questioning of state prisoners is 
custodial, and that a Miranda warning must always be given before asking any question 
of a prisoner which might conceivably lead to incriminating evidence. This would 
"torture [Miranda] to the illogical position of providing greater protection to a prisoner 
than to his nonimprisoned counterpart." Cervantes v. Walker. 589 F.2d 424, 427 (9th Cir. 
1978). 
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While Miranda clearly applies to prisoners, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4, 
88 S. Ct. 1503, 1404 (1968), several federal jurisdictions have determined that 
incarceration alone does not render Miranda warnings necessary. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 
U.S. 292, 298-99, 110 S. Ct. 2394, 2398 (1990) (no Miranda violation where an 
imprisoned suspect makes incriminating statements to an undercover government agent 
posing as the suspect's cellmate); see also United States v. Willoughbv, 860 F.2d 15, 23 
(2d Cir. 1988), cert, denied 488 U.S. 1033, 109 S. Ct. 846 (1989); Leviston v. Black 843 
F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 865, 109 S. Ct. 168 (1988); Cervantes, 589 
F.2d at 427. Even the United States Supreme Court appears open to this interpretation. 
See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 299, 110 S.Ct. at 2398 (noting parenthetically that ,f[t]he bare 
fact of custody may not in every instance require a [Miranda] warning even when the 
suspect is aware that he is speaking to an official, but we do not have occasion to explore 
that issue here."); see also Bradley v. Ohio, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S. Ct. 3258 (1990) 
(denying certiorari in a case that required more than mere incarceration to meet the 
"custody" requirement for Miranda when the suspect is a prisoner). 
The leading case in this area is Cervantes v. Walker. 589 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1978). 
In that case, the court articulated the "added imposition" test, which emphasizes the 
"restriction" required by Miranda to the accused's freedom of action and requires "a 
change in the surroundings of the prisoner which results in an added imposition on his 
freedom of movement." Li. at 428. In other words, the focus is on acts which, under the 
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totality of the circumstances, place further limitations on the prisoner at the time of 
questioning. Cervantes. 589 F.2d at 428; United States v. Menzer. 29 F.3d 1223, 1232 
(7th Cir.), cert, denied. 513 U.S. 1002, 115 S. Ct. 515 (1994); Leviston. 843 F.2d at 304. 
The Ninth Circuit Court adhered to the objective, reasonable person standard, making the 
question one of "whether a reasonable person would believe there had been a restriction 
of his freedom over and above that in his normal prisoner setting." Cervantes. 589 F.2d 
at 428. The court looked to the totality of the circumstances, and identified several 
factors as being significant to the inquiry: 1) the language used to summon the inmate for 
questioning; 2) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; 3) the extent to which the 
inmate is confronted with evidence of his guilt; and 4) the additional pressure exerted to 
detain him. Llat428. 
The test set forth in Cervantes has been adopted in several jurisdictions, including 
the Tenth Circuit, based largely on the same reasoning. United States v. Scalf. 725 F.2d 
1272, 1275 (10th Cir. 1984) (a prison inmate was not deprived of his freedom nor 
questioned in a coercive environment for purposes of Miranda when an officer charged 
with security at the prison questioned the prisoner briefly through the bars of his cell 
about an incident which had occurred in the prison minutes earlier); see also Menzer. 29 
F.3dat 1231-32; Garcia v. Sindetarv. 13 F.3d 1487, 1492 (11th Cir.), cert, denied. 513 
U.S. 908, 115 S. Ct. 276 (1994); Willoughbv. 860 F.2d at 23-24; Leviston. 843 F.2d at 
304 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cooper. 800 F.2d 412, 414-15 (4th Cir. 1986); United 
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States v. Conlev. 779 F.2d 970, 972-73 (4th Cir. 1985), cert, denied. 479 U.S. 830, 107 S. 
Ct. 114 (1986); Flittie v. Solem. 751 F.2d967, 974 (8th Cir. 1985), cert, denied. 475 U.S. 
1025, 106 S. Ct. 1223 (1986); People v. Fradiue. 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 80 Cal.App.4th 15 
(Cal. App. 3 Dist. 2000); People v. Patterson. 588 N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (111.), cert, denied. 
506 U.S. 838, 113 S. Ct. 116 (1992). Some of these jurisdictions have identified 
additional factors relevant to the inquiry, including: the individual's freedom to leave the 
scene, circumstances suggesting a measure of compulsion beyond the confinement, and 
the purpose, place and length of the questioning. Menzer. 29 F.3d at 1232; Willoughby. 
860 F.2d at 24; Leviston. 843 F.2d at 304; Conlev. 779 F.2d at 973. 
In view of these authorities, including the Tenth Circuit Court, the trial court's use 
of the test in this case was not error. Defendant was an inmate of the Decker Lake facility 
before he ran and was under the direct supervision of youth corrections at Decker Lake 
even while on temporary assignment to the Genesis program, from which he escaped (R. 
70: 15-16). He was picked up and returned to Decker Lake on an arrest warrant due to 
his escape and was once again an inmate at the facility at the time the interview at issue 
occurred. The only thing to be decided by the interview was whether preliminary 
restrictions would be required, e.g., if he needed medical or other intervention that 
prevented his immediate return to his residential unit under the usual conditions (R. 
69:12-14, 20-22). Because of his inmate status, defendant would automatically be 
deemed to be "in custody" under the general Miranda test regardless of the content of the 
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interview, bringing this matter within the scope of the prison situation which requires 
application of the "added imposition" approach. 
As the trial court found, there was no "added imposition" present in this case. The 
interview was a regular intake interview which would usually be done by a counselor on 
the unit to which defendant was assigned. As those counselors were occupied, Pacheco 
conducted the interview (R. 69:20-21). Defendant was seventeen years old and in a 
situation in which he had likely found himself at least once before: he had presumably 
already undergone a similar interview at his initial placement in the facility (R. 
70:19-such an interview was "standard operating procedure"). As Pacheco was not 
defendant's normal counselor, defendant was not likely overly concerned about 
Pacheco's future influence on defendant's incarceration conditions. Defendant was not in 
handcuffs or in a lockdown cell, and nothing in the record suggests that he was mentally 
or physically ill-equipped to deal with the situation in which he found himself or with the 
type of questioning utilized (R. 69:22; 70:19). The interview was not prolonged-lasting 
only forty-five minutes-was not conducted by a police officer, and was not conducted in 
a threatening or coercive manner (R. 69:10-11, 18-21). The record shows that defendant 
was not free to leave the facility, but does not establish that he was not free to terminate 
the interview (R. 69:12, 21). Pacheco implied that defendant would have to wait for the 
regular staff before he could be cleared for housing, but nothing establishes that defendant 
was not able to terminate his intake interview with Pacheco at any time (R. 69:21). 
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Hence, there was no reason for a reasonable prisoner to believe that there was a restriction 
of his freedom over and above that to be found in his normal prisoner setting. Cervantes. 
589 F.2d at 429. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its conclusion under the 
"added imposition" approach that there "was no added imposition imposed in this 
particular case warranting the administration of the Miranda warnings" (R. 71:4). 
C. Defendant's Confession was Voluntary Where There was No Police Tactic 
Designed to Elicit an Incriminating Response From Defendant 
Not only was there no custody for Miranda purposes, but there was no 
"interrogation" as required before a Miranda violation may be found. The term 
"interrogation" in this context refers to express questioning as well as to "any words or 
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and 
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response[.]" Yoder, 935 P.2d at 545 (quotation omitted). Not "all statements obtained by 
the police after a person has been taken into custody are to be considered the product of 
interrogation." Innis. 466 U.S. at 300, 100 S. Ct. at 1689; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
481, 487, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630 (1966). Rather, "'[interrogation,' as conceptualized in 
the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that 
inherent in custody itself." Innis. 446 U.S. at 300, 100 S. Ct. at 1689. Moreover, 
"[vjolunteeredstatements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their 
admissibility is not affected by [the Miranda decision]." Id. (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 
at 487, 86 S. Ct. at 1630) (emphasis added). 
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Thus, for a statement made without Miranda warnings to be inadmissible, it must 
"be established that a suspect's incriminating response was the product of words or 
actions on the part of the police that they should have known were reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response." Innis. 446 U.S. at 303, 100 S. Ct. at 1691 (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, statements that are not the product of interrogation, but which are 
volunteered, are admissible. See, e.g.. State v. Riggs. 1999 UT App 271, [^17, 987 P.2d 
1281 (asking a defendant whether he remembered the accident was not interrogation as it 
was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, so incriminating reply was 
admissible); State v. Dutchie. 969 P.2d 422, 426 (Utah 1998) (detective's request for 
background information not interrogation, therefore defendant's voluntary and 
spontaneous statements were admissible); State v. Hayes. 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 
1993) (telling defendant that he was under arrest was not interrogation, therefore his 
spontaneous voluntary utterance was not the product of interrogation). 
"[A]n express question from police to a suspect does not amount to interrogation 
if, under the circumstances, the question was not reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response." Lavton City v. Aragon. 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 1991). 
"The likelihood of incrimination must be determined from all of the circumstances; the 
same question may constitute interrogation in one situation but not in another." kL 
"Moreover, in determining whether a question is or is not interrogation, the relationship 
between the question's subject matter and the suspected criminal act is highly 
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significant." Id The subjective intent of police in asking the question is relevant, but the 
main focus is on "whether the suspect is likely to incriminate himself... in response." 
Id. "Ascertaining the likelihood of incrimination under the circumstances of a specific 
situation is a factual determination." IcL 
Miranda is designed to protect against police practices. Defendant does not 
challenge any police action.7 All the questioning, until after he volunteered his 
confession, was conducted by a youth corrections counselor with the Department of 
Human Services, not a police officer (R. 69:10-11, 19-20). Pacheco was not acting, and 
had not been trained to act, as a police officer in conducting the intake interview at issue 
(id.). Neither did he ask questions likely to produce psychological pressures that would 
subject defendant to Pacheco's "will." See Innis. 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S. Ct. at 1689. 
Further, the questioning was not likely to elicit the incriminating response 
complained of under the attendant circumstances. The "questioning" prior to defendant's 
spontaneous confession of theft consisted of an initial request for where defendant had 
been and what he had been doing (R. 69:14), and periodic comments that the story had 
"holes" and that defendant should tell the whole truth (R. 69:14-17). While, under some 
7Should this Court find that defendant was "in custody" for Miranda purposes, the 
State concedes that the subsequent questioning by Officer Ford following defendant's 
voluntary admission of theft (i.e., where did you leave the van, was it running, etc.) 
required the use of Miranda warnings and, hence, the responses should have been 
suppressed as they were elicited by an officer via questions that were reasonably likely to 
elicit an incriminating response. Aragon. 813 P.2d at 1215-16. 
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circumstances, such questioning might be designed to elicit an incriminating response, 
such was not the case here where there was no reason to believe a response would be 
incriminating. The "highly significant" relationship between the questions' subject 
matter-"the truth"-and the suspected criminal activity is nonexistent in this case because, 
until defendant voluntarily confessed, there was no reason for either Pacheco or Ford to 
believe that defendant was involved in any criminal activity aside from his escape from 
Genesis.8 Nothing in the record suggests that either Pacheco or Ford had any reason to 
suspect that a stolen van was in any way involved in the matter or to anticipate that any 
incriminating response might result from Pacheco's questions. As was evident from 
defendant's initial responses, Pacheco's inquiries could be answered without any 
reference at all to defendant's theft of the van (R. 69:14-17) While defendant added 
details with each telling of the story, there was nothing in his responses which indicated 
8To the extent the initial questioning was likely to elicit a response incriminating 
defendant in his escape, it does not require reversal for two reasons: 1) no police action 
was involved surrounding the questioning on the escape; and 2) any constitutional 
violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the remaining evidence on 
the escape issue, including that defendant was found to be missing from Genesis on 
January 4, called authorities from outside the program on January 5, was picked up 
outside the program to be returned to the authorities, and discussed his actions with 
Officer Ford on the way to Decker Lake, which discussion has not been challenged on 
appeal. See State v. KiriluL 1999 UT App 30,1f 11, 975 P.2d 469; see also State v. 
Morrison. 937 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 
619, 628-29, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1717 (1993)). "In evaluating whether an evidentiary error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we focus on 'whether there is a reasonable 
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.'" 
Morrison. 937 P.2d at 1296 (citation omitted). 
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that he would be confessing to theft until he in fact confessed. Pacheco made no threats 
or promises to induce defendant to disclose additional incriminating details. Defendant 
was already going back to Decker Lake and would be subject to the repercussions 
guaranteed to come from his escape. There was no reason, objective or subjective, to 
believe that he would admit to any conduct which would incriminate him in any 
additional criminal activity. 
Finally, Pacheco's relevant subjective intent was to elicit from defendant a 
narrative from which he would be able to determine whether defendant was sober, lucid, 
not in need of immediate medical attention, not an apparent danger to himself, others, or 
the facility generally, and able to be readmitted to his living unit. The exchange allowed 
him to determination that these points were not at issue and that no follow-up testing was 
required (R. 69:21-22). 
Accordingly, there was no police interrogation which would require the giving of 
Miranda warnings in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
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Titles 76 and 77 
76*6-403. Theft — Evidence to support accusation. 
Conduct denominated theft in this part constitutes a single offense embrac-
ing the separate offenses such as those heretofore known as larceny, larceny by 
trick, larceny by bailees, embezzlement, false pretense, extortion, blackmail, 
receiving stolen property. An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence 
that it was committed in any manner specified in Sections 76-6-404 through 
76-6-410, subject to the power of the court to ensure a fair trial by granting a 
continuance or other appropriate relief where the conduct of the defense would 
be prejudiced by lack of fair notice or by surprise. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-403, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-6-403; 1974, eh. 32, § 17. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
Judge Medley: This is case No. 991901631, 
State vs. Swink. And counsel, why don't you identify 
yourself for the record. 
Mr. Shapiro: David Shapiro on behalf of Mr. 
Swink who is present in custody. 
Judge Medley: And Mr. Esqueda, this is your 
case, correct? 
Mr. Esqueda: It is, Your Honor. 
Judge Medley: Let's take care of the 
suppression issue first. And let me say to both of 
you that these comments are intended to be summary in 
nature only, because I have yet had the opportunity to 
reduce this to written form, which may very well 
become necessary. But let me simply say that I'm 
going to deny the Defense's Motion to Suppress in this 
particular case, in essence, for the following summary 
reasons. I've had a chance now to read the 
authorities that were submitted to me and also go 
through the transcript that was submitted to me also. 
And in this court's opinion it's appropriate to deny 
the motion to suppress for the reason that I've 
concluded that the appropriate test to be applied 
regarding the issues in this Motion to Suppress is the 
concept of added imposition. And based upon this 



























court's determination of the facts and circumstances 
of this case, this court is of the opinion that there 
is -- was no added imposition imposed in this 
particular case warranting the administration of the 
Miranda warnings. Furthermore, in this court's view, 
this court is of the opinion that the counselor, and 
there was a counselor involved in this discussion with 
Mr. Swink, consistent with his testimony in this 
court's view, first of all, he didn't have prior, 
(inaudible) he didn't have prior knowledge of the 
specific criminal activity when he had this 
conversation with Mr. Swink. He also testified, in 
this court's view, and it seems to be reasonable and 
consistent that his primary purpose was that of the 
safety of Mr. Swink, the safety of other individuals 
in the facility and the facility itself. That in 
essence, this was an intake interview. It lasted 
approximately 45 minutes in duration. Based upon the 
conversation, it appears that there was no coercion or 
compulsion of any nature in this court's view in any 
way. And for all those reasons, and again, that's 
intended to be a summary, this court does not believe 
that the facts and circumstances necessitated the 
admonition, the Miranda admonition. For those 
1 reasons, I'm going to deny the Motion to Suppress. | 
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